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　【Note】
Reinterpreting Reasonable Pluralism:
How Can Rawlsian Political Liberalism Overcome the Dilemma of Cultural Inclusion? 
KONNO, Minako*
Abstract: Liberalism is an ideal model of cultural inclusion. For all its attractiveness, 
attention remains drawn to social injustice, especially in the so-called private sphere. 
John Rawls’s theory of political liberalism has been a central target of feminist criticism 
over the past several decades, the most prominent critic being Susan Mollar Okin. 
Rawls’s “political turn” and explicit ambition to include non-liberal cultures in his vision 
apparently exacerbate such implicit problems of liberalism. Rawls does not necessarily 
provide enough material to defend himself against these criticisms. This said, I argue 
that Rawlsian political liberalism can be made more viable by reinterpreting his 
important concept of reasonable pluralism. We should situate ourselves firmly in its 
scheme of individual agency so as to act on our social environment, supported by our 
political ties with others as citizens. If we give individuals a more central role, to create 
and sustain reasonable pluralism, it can become a valuable tool with which to overcome 
the dilemma of liberal inclusion.　
Keywords: Rawls’s political liberalism, public-private distinction, Okin
1. The Dilemma of Liberal Inclusion
　　While the liberal ideal of living with diverse others is attractive in many ways, if we take 
this ideal further, it comes to a point where we face a dilemma. Those of us who have formed 
some attachment to liberal society want to enlarge the social space of freedom as much as 
possible, where each of us is allowed to pursue his or her life plan, either as an individual or 
with others. This cannot be an “anything goes” situation, since in these diverse ways of life, there 
may be some features that we do not wish to accommodate as liberal citizens. Certainly gender 
inequality in family practices, for example, has been an object of social concern. 
　　Concerns for social injustice have led many theorists to argue that it is necessary for a 
society to limit the social space of freedom with law and other state devices. The problem is 
that the scope of such state control can so easily be expanded far beyond its original intention, 
betraying our profound commitment to a free society. We have to be cautious, as well-meaning 
liberal arguments concerning social injustice may end up recommending liberal policing of 
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some sort, gravely contradicting the liberal premise. Even seemingly unobtrusive measures, 
such as liberal education, may unwittingly diminish the social space where diverse ways of life 
can flourish, by encouraging people who cherish traditional or religious values, for example, to 
interpret their social environment through a liberal lens. 
　　We need to find a way to address social injustice effectively, while being true to our 
commitment to the freedom to live with others in diverse ways. How is it possible to conceive a 
society that provides ample social space so that people can freely pursue their own ends and life 
projects with others while properly identifying and addressing unjust inequality or practices? 
This paper aimed to show that John Rawls’s concept of “reasonable pluralism” offers insights for 
answering this question. It is not utterly utopian, according to Rawls, to envision the liberal society 
we truly want to be, in which diverse ways of life can flourish, without truly unjust social and 
structural features passing unquestioned as mere cultural differences or matters of faith. 
　　Rawls is usually regarded as a moral or political philosopher, not a sociologist, and his theory 
is considered a theory of the principles of justice, rather than a theory of society. But his theory 
of liberalism is notably sociological in its aspirations and scheme, since his ultimate concern has 
always been with the quality of our mutual ties1). He attempts to demonstrate this by presenting 
us with a realistic vision of liberal society in which, despite being profoundly divided in terms of 
the more comprehensive ways of life, everyone forms and enjoys “ties of friendship” with others 
as liberal citizens. He hopes his vision will motivate us to be willing members of a collective 
enterprise and to move our society forward in realizing it. Rawls believes that the construction 
of the social world hinges on our imagination of what it is possible for us to achieve at our best 
and that, if a theory cannot tap into the values essential in such normative self-understanding, 
it will never be able to help realize our potential as social beings (Konno 2016). Rawls’s theory 
is a normative theory not only of  society but also in society. In this sense, he is of interest and 
importance for sociological theorizing.
　　Rawls stresses the importance of distinguishing “the political (public)” from “the non-political 
(non-public)” and argues that by observing this distinction carefully, we are able to envision 
a society where people enjoy social unity while pursuing diverse life plans according to their 
conscience. To some liberals, a good society will be realized only when everyone adopts some 
kind of liberal outlook and lives according to liberal values; indoctrination with, and discipline by, 
these values are precursors of any good liberal society. However, Rawls considers this approach 
problematic, mainly because it contradicts the profound diversity in our worldviews about what 
our world is and should be. Not everyone agrees, for instance, that liberal individualism is the right 
way to comprehend our relationship with others. 
　　Indeed, to the eyes of some, this seems to make matters worse. Liberalism has been criticized 
for its classical public-private distinction and for its inability to handle social injustices in so-
called private spheres. Feminists have been especially adamant critics, as they have typically 
identified and pointed to gender injustice in the family in this regard. It may be considered 
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that political liberalism only exacerbates the problem, as it claims, even more clearly than 
conventional liberalism, that liberalism is only for the political=public domain. I will argue that 
this is not the case, although Rawls himself comes short of defending his theory. To see that the 
concept of reasonable pluralism, a central concept of Rawlsian political liberalism, points us in a 
promising direction, we need to clarify how Rawls himself construes the distinction between the 
public and non-public. This leads to a re-interpretation of the concept of reasonable pluralism 
as more dynamic and individual-centered than previously regarded. Only then will we be able to 
understand the truly transformative potential of Rawls’s social vision. 
2. Okin’s Critique of Rawlsian Political Liberalism
2.1 Justice in the Family 
　　Societies aiming to be truly liberal may unwittingly accommodate what we do not want to 
accommodate, under the name of diversity. For example, in heralding liberal inclusion, liberal 
society may harbor sexist ways of life, in which women are unjustly relegated to a secondary 
status, or their social role is limited, compared to men. The ideal of liberal inclusion may also 
deprive us of means to criticize ways of life, especially in the so-called private sphere, since the 
ideal can easily be tied to cultural or value pluralism, which regards diversity itself as good, or 
understands culture as something that is immune to outside criticisms.    
　　The section titled “On the Family as Part of the Basic Structure” in “The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited” (Rawls 1999) exhibits Rawls’s most mature view of political liberalism, 
and we can identify Rawls’s sincere response to feminist criticism against the “liberal public-
private distinction”. His response, with his characteristic modesty, however, was something of a 
disappointment for feminists such as Susan Mollar Okin, who had been one of the most potent 
defenders of his theory’s potential as elaborated in Rawls’s “A Theory of Justice.” 
　　After the publication of Political Liberalism, Okin immediately voiced strong concerns about 
it. In her view, it continues to “give us mixed signals about Rawls’s views on the application of his 
principles of justice to issues of gender” (Okin 1994: 24). She is particularly troubled by Rawls’s 
treatment of the family. In Political Liberalism, he states clearly that the political is distinct from 
the personal and the familial, as the personal and the familial are “affectional” in ways different 
from the political (Rawls 1993: 137). Yet Okin sees a grave inconsistency here because Rawls 
claims, as the section title makes clear, that the family is part of the basic structure of society, 
which is supposed to be governed by political principles of justice. Okin (1994: 26) asks, “How can 
families be both part of the basic structure and not political?”
　　Okin repeatedly claims that just political principles should be applied to the family, and this 
is even more needed within the framework of political liberalism because political liberalism 
is built on the core assumption of reasonable pluralism. Reasonably plural society is a highly 
inclusive ideal, where a wide variety of comprehensive worldviews (“comprehensive doctrines” in 
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Rawls’s terminology), including traditional or conservative ones that heavily restrict women’s 
place within society, for example, can be included as reasonable, on the condition that they 
are somehow able to support a liberal political conception of justice. Okin is concerned that 
the comprehensive life of a woman who follows such doctrine may severely interfere with her 
ability to think and act as a free and equal member of liberal political society, even when it is 
expected of her to do so. If the family is one of the spheres where these doctrines may be lived 
out more fully, we would like to be assured that our political society has the means to prevent 
her familial relationship from negatively affecting her.  Okin argues that the political principles 
of justice should be directly applied to the family.
　　Okin was “gratified” that Rawls finally responded to feminist criticisms of his political 
liberalism, the most prominent of which were hers, by including the section specifically on the 
family in his important paper. She praised him for stating, even more clearly than before, that 
the family is part of the basic structure because “one of [the family’s] main roles is to be the 
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation 
to the next” (Rawls 1999: 157). He thus acknowledged that reproductive labor is indispensable 
for political society. 
　　For Okin, however, Rawls’s response was far from satisfactory. Rawls asserts that it is a 
“misconception” to think “that the principles of justice do not apply to the family and hence 
those principles do not secure equal justice for women and their children” (Rawls 1999: 158). 
But he states on the next page, 
[P]olitical principles do not apply directly to [the family’s] internal life, but they do impose 
essential constraints on the family as an institution and so guarantee the basic rights and 
liberties, and the freedom and opportunities, of all its members…The family as part of the basic 
structure cannot violate these freedoms. Since wives are equally citizens with their husbands, 
they have all the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities as their husbands; and this, 
together with the correct application of the other principles of justice, suffices to secure their 
equality and independence. (1999: 159)
Okin finds this “more than a little puzzling” (Okin 2004: 1563). To be sure, she acknowledges 
(correctly) that Rawls understands the basic rights and liberties of citizens not merely in 
formal terms, but in a more substantial sense as well, citing Rawls’s proposal for alleviating or 
compensating for the negative consequences of divorce for the women who have practiced a 
traditional division of family roles. Still, she was not convinced.  
2.2 Concerns for Liberal Inclusion
　　A simple response to Okin would be that she fails to understand that Rawls distinguishes 
the “internal life” of the family from “the family as an institution” here. As an institution 
composing part of the basic structure of society, the institutional shape of the family must 
subject to public reason, which is the reason sharable by free and equal liberal citizens, so that 
it constitutes an accurate expression of our political self-understanding as such. Rawls makes 
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this clear when he says, “Clearly the prohibition of abuse and neglect of children, and much else, 
will, as constraints, be a vital part of family law” (Rawls 1999: 160). Similarly, domestic violence 
against adult women (and men), for example, would also have to be constrained. 
　　This response, however, is not enough, as Okin’s concern is deeper. It largely arises from 
the fact that Rawls gives central importance in his theory to the concept of reasonable pluralism. 
Reasonable pluralism is an ideal form of social unity in conditioned diversity, whereby society 
contains a plurality of comprehensive doctrines that support a family of political conceptions 
of justice from their own (comprehensive) point of view. In the society Rawls envisions, the 
plurality of comprehensive worldviews is understood by people as both an empirical given, 
resulting from the limitation in our judgmental capacity as human beings, and a desideratum, 
to encourage individuals to freely pursue their “chosen” life plans2). Even a traditional 
comprehensive doctrine, in which women and men are situated differently, can be reasonable 
in the sense that they, for political purposes, are willing to uphold a liberal political conception 
of justice for their own reasons. With regard to public reason, an essential element of a political 
conception of justice, he says, 
Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive 
doctrine, religious or nonreligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the 
essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. (Rawls 1999: 132) 
Yet these doctrines may, nonetheless, negatively affect women in that those whose lives are 
guided by these doctrines can experience difficulties when it comes to regarding themselves as 
citizens, i.e., as free and equal members of the social cooperative enterprise. This is problematic 
because regarding oneself as a free and equal citizen in one’s political life, while living the other 
aspects of one’s life from a certain comprehensive viewpoint, is one of the most important 
sources of viability for Rawlsian politically-liberal society.
　　Rawls’s apparent insistence that families are voluntary associations exacerbates the 
problem. A political conception of justice, Rawls argues, cannot and should not internally 
govern a social sphere lived from within a certain comprehensive worldview because we need to 
carefully observe the distinction “between the point of view of people as citizens and their point 
of view as members of families and of other associations” (Rawls 1999: 159). If we consider 
families as “voluntary” associations, this voluntary nature, in itself, would make it more difficult 
to apply a political conception of justice to the internal life of the family3).  
3. Re-examining Rawls
3.1 Citizen First?
　　Those who try to defend Rawls from Okin’s critique seem to be able to rely on the following 
Rawls text.
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The adult members of families and other associations are equal citizens first: that is their basic 
position. No institution or association in which they are involved can violate their rights as 
citizens. (Rawls 1999: 160-1)
This is, indeed, a cogent statement. What should be noted, however, is that here he speaks from 
a political citizen’s perspective. In other words, this is a description of how the social world is 
seen by someone assuming a citizen’s point of view, although Rawls himself does not make it 
very clear.
　　At the same time, Rawlsian political liberalism is willing to welcome those comprehensive 
doctrines that do not regard citizen status very highly (Rawls 1999: 173). This is precisely what 
Okin is so concerned about it. If these doctrines contain the elements of women’s subordination, 
she argues, we have reasons to worry that women’s very constrained day-to-day lives affect 
their thoughts and actions in a way that interferes with their self-understanding as free and 
equal liberal citizens from the political point of view and, hence, their ability to take part in the 
activities of public reason.
　　We have to note that Okin’s concern taps into the very characteristic that makes Rawls’s 
theory unique in the liberal tradition, in that mainstream liberalism has often argued that all 
must regard the political as the most important. Those who follow the doctrines that reluctantly 
support a political conception of justice most likely do not view themselves as “citizens first”. 
They may think that political matters are rather marginal, or that being a citizen is just an 
appendage to their more comprehensive existence. Rawls even depicted the two viewpoints, 
the liberal citizen’s and the comprehensive person’s viewpoint, as being opposed to each other, 
each trying to limit invasion from the other, although both viewpoints are held by the same 
individuals. As he puts it, 
As Citizens we have reasons to impose the constraints specified by the political conception of 
justice on associations; while as members of associations we have reasons for limiting those 
constraints so that they leave room for a free and flourishing internal life appropriate to the 
association in question. (Rawls 1999: 159) 
It may not be very reassuring, then, when Rawls says that, “at some point society has to rely on 
the natural affection and goodwill of the mature family members” (1999: 160).  This exemplifies, 
to Okin, Rawls’s indifference toward women and family justice. 
3.2 No Exemption?
　　Another passage that seems to set out a defense for political liberalism against Okin’s 
criticism is as follows:
A domain so-called, or a sphere of life, is not…something already given apart from political 
conceptions of justice. A domain is not a kind of space, or place, but rather is simply the result, 
or upshot, of how the principles of political justice are applied, directly to the basic structure 
and indirectly to the association within it. The principles defining the equal basic liberties and 
opportunities of citizens always hold in and through all so-called domains. The equal rights of 
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women and the basic rights of their children as future citizens are inalienable and protect them 
wherever they are…If the so-called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from justice, 
then there is no such thing. (Rawls 1999: 161)
Here Rawls clearly states that no social sphere, including the “private” one, is exempt from 
liberal political justice, even though the application of a political conception of justice to the 
family as individual associations is “indirect”.
　　As mentioned above, this “indirect application” means that the institution of the family 
(family law, pertinent tax system, social welfare scheme for supporting families, etc.) should be 
informed by public reason so that it properly respects women’s free and equal status as liberal 
citizens along with men. The problem is that such institutional “application” does not seem to 
reach the ways women live their comprehensive lives on a day-to-day basis within families as 
associations. If so, is it really sensible to say, as Rawls does, that, “the equal rights of women and 
the basic rights of their children as future citizens…protect them wherever they are”? Doesn’t 
this remark sound a little hollow4)? 
　　Some interpret the first part of the above passage more radically and argue that Rawls not 
only blurred the public-private distinction but understood the non-public itself as the creation 
of the political5). But this interpretation has the same problem we have already identified. 
Certainly, from the perspective of a citizen who upholds some political conception of justice, 
the non-public sphere is one in which that conception does not apply directly, but indirectly. In 
this regard, a so-called “private” sphere, which is lived under some comprehensive worldview, is 
indeed not “something already given apart from political conceptions of justice”. But this is true 
only when we assume a political citizen’s point of view. From the viewpoint of a comprehensive 
person, on the other hand, a comprehensive sphere of life is already lived, apart from any 
political conception of justice6). If we attempt to defend Rawlsian political liberalism, we need to 
show how we can be assured that women’s equality and freedom are protected “wherever they 
are”.
　　Although Rawls was modest about the scope of his theory, the framework of his political 
liberalism makes it necessary to examine more closely the interface between the public and 
non-public7). We cannot get away with this simply by noting it is beyond political liberalism’s 
intended scope. Rawls does seem to have been aware of the limitation of his reply. Near the end 
of the section about the family in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, he says,  
If we say the gender system includes whatever social arrangements adversely affect the equal 
basic liberties and opportunities of women, as well as those of their children as future citizens, 
then surely that system is subject to critique by the principles of justice. The question then 
becomes whether the fulfillment of these principles suffices to remedy the gender system’s 
faults. The remedy depends in part on social theory and human psychology, and much else. It 
cannot be settled by a political conception of justice alone. (Rawls 1999: 163)
Here, Rawls clearly refers to a territory uncharted by his theory: “whatever social arrangements 
adversely affect the equal basic liberties and opportunities of women,” which I interpret as 
東京女子大学社会学年報　第 5号／ 2017
56
including the nature of the non-political (comprehensive) lives women lead.    
In the next section, I will argue that the “social theory” that Rawls’s believed was needed, can be 
developed, in part, by reconstructing the concept of reasonable pluralism. A more individual-
centered and dynamic interpretation of the concept will help us fill an important theoretical gap 
in Rawlsian political liberalism.
4. Individual-Centered Interpretation of Reasonable Pluralism
4.1 The Meaning of Overlapping Consensus for the Individual
　　Reasonable pluralism is a state in which diverse reasonable, comprehensive doctrines 
coexist in society. A reasonable comprehensive doctrine supports a liberal political conception 
of justice from within its worldview. There can be various ways to support a political conception 
of justice. Some doctrines support it as congruent with themselves, others as a module to be 
fitted within them, and yet others only indirectly, supposing that their interest is effectively 
met by supporting it (Rawls 1993: 168-71). An overlapping consensus is obtained when a 
wide range of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, liberal and non-liberal, manage to support 
a political conception of justice (or a family of political conceptions of justice) for their own 
reasons. Overlapping consensus is a crucial part of the second stage of Rawls’s vision8), where 
the stability of a politically just society is at stake. 
　　But this picture is incomplete in an important way, in that it is difficult to identify what 
role individuals actually play. Rawls almost always talks about the compatibility of a political 
conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine, but what does this mean? How do 
individuals fit into his picture? The answer to this question is suggested by the passage quoted 
above. To quote only the most relevant part again, 
A domain is not a kind of space, or place, but rather is simply the result, or upshot, of how the 
principles of political justice are applied…The principles defining the equal basic liberties and 
opportunities of citizens always hold in and through all so-called domains. (Rawls 1999: 161)
Rawls stresses that, central to his political liberalism, is the distinction between “the political” 
and “non-political”. The first part of the above quote concerns what this distinction means. The 
political sphere and the non-political sphere are not like two countries, adjacent to each other 
on a map. Rather, they are two aspects, or modes of the same world, each presenting itself as 
we shift our point of view between that of a comprehensive person and that of a citizen acting 
in and perceiving the social world. Our social world will be “political” when we see and live it 
from a citizen’s point of view, where self and others are understood as citizens, and we interact 
as such; it will be “non-political” when we see and live it from a comprehensive person’s point of 
view, where self and others are understood as comprehensive persons, and we interact as such. 
　　A relationship between individuals can be seen as belonging to the non-political domain 
when each member, as a comprehensive person, regards self and others as members of the 
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same family, for example, where they live their common life following some comprehensive 
doctrine. The relationship of the same individuals can also be seen as belonging to the political 
domain, when each views self and others as citizens of a political society, along with other 
individual citizens. 
　　Individuals are not expected to assume a citizen’s viewpoint all the time. This perspective 
only applies when they should act as citizens, such as when they engage in a public discussion 
about the form of public institutions in an assembly, as a political representative, for example. 
Additionally, as an ordinary person, individuals are expected to assume a citizen’s viewpoint 
when they determine their stance toward fundamental political issues (Rawls 1999: 133-6). Still, 
if they are to fulfill this civic duty, they need to retain their ability to understand themselves 
as free and equal citizens, whenever so required. They need to make sure that their ability 
to regard themselves as citizens, supporting a political conception of justice and being able 
to act accordingly, is not undermined by their comprehensive way of life, which may make it 
impossible for them to regard themselves as citizens. In this way, “principles defining the equal 
basic liberties and opportunities of citizens” included in a political conception of justice, “always 
hold in and through all so-called domains”.
4.2 Lived Compatibility
　　It is actually a compatibility issue, then, for an individual  who, in a well-ordered society, 
is expected to live a “double life”9), the life as a political citizen and the life as a comprehensive 
person. Individuals are responsible for making sure their day-to-day comprehensive life is 
compatible with their political self-understanding as a free and equal citizen, a core ability of 
Rawlsian citizens who affirm a political conception and abide by it.
　　When a woman finds that her political self-understanding as a free and equal citizen is 
being threatened by the way she lives her comprehensive life, she is encouraged to act on her 
situation so that her comprehensive life mode becomes compatible, for herself , with her political 
life as a citizen, centered on her self-understanding as a free and equal member of a social 
cooperative enterprise. Often, she will have to negotiate with others, with whom she shares 
her comprehensive life, to bring about changes. Of course, when she lives her life from within 
a particular comprehensive worldview, she affirms, probably all we can say in many cases, that 
her self-understanding as a political citizen should only be secured as a potential. But what is 
needed here is only that she has the capacity to take on a citizen’s perspective when necessary, 
not that she always looks at the social world from that point of view. 
　　Compatibility in this sense is lived, rather than logical, although logical compatibility may be 
an important part of it for many. Lived compatibility may be more demanding, as it may require 
more than logical compatibility. Rawls postulates that, in the state of reasonable pluralism, a 
sufficient number of comprehensive doctrines appropriately accommodate a conception of 
justice somewhere within their worldview and, thus, are compatible with a conception of justice. 
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If so, following a comprehensive doctrine of this sort may, nonetheless, affect the political self-
understanding of an individual who follows it, jeopardizing her own understanding of her 
political self as a free and equal citizen. An example may be when the comprehensive doctrine 
in question regards women as inferior beings, or less human, as compared to men. 
　　On the other hand, lived compatibility can be less demanding than logical compatibility 
when, for example, apparently incompatible public and non-public (comprehensive) worldviews 
in a logical sense may, however, be lived as compatible, by someone who can live in these 
two worlds, that is, lived from two different and separate viewpoints (citizen’s viewpoint and 
comprehensive person’s viewpoint), experiencing absolutely no interaction between the two. For 
someone who believes women are spiritually inferior from a certain religious point of view, for 
instance, her non-public life, governed by this religious view, would not undermine her public 
life and self-understanding as a free and equal member of liberal citizenry, when her two lives, 
or two modes of her life lived from within two different worldviews, are simply on two different 
planes. 
　　Most people’s experience of lived compatibility, if any, would be somewhere between 
these two extremes. But the point is that, as reasonable pluralism maintains, it is individual 
citizens who make this possible, by taking responsibility to make sure that their non-public 
life is compatible with their liberal self-understanding. Lived compatibility can only be judged 
from the viewpoint of the individual who actually lives that life. No other actors can judge this. 
Reasonable pluralism is possible when individual men and women are such responsible citizens.
　　Of course, this does not mean that each individual has to assume this responsibility in a 
solitary manner. When they are blind to themselves, as is often the case, others can advise them, 
try to persuade them, and may often open their eyes about their situation and change their 
view about it. Citizens support each other in being, and continuing to be, responsible liberal 
citizens. If “women…are protected anywhere they go” (and for that matter, men are as well, of 
course), it is because a majority of individual men and women, as free and equal citizens, protect 
themselves and others in this way. Without resorting to direct intervention from the state 
institution, Rawlsian political liberalism reaches out to the non-political sphere, indirectly but 
effectively, by trusting those citizens. 
4.3 Cooperation for Responsible Citizenship
　　An important question, in this regard, would be: How are individuals encouraged to become 
responsible citizens? In the well-ordered society Rawls envisioned, this function is primarily 
performed by the basic structure of society, governed by a political conception of justice, which 
has educative effects on people’s political self-understanding and acts (Rawls 1993: 163). By 
growing up in a society where the shape of major social institutions is, and is publicly known to 
be, determined by public reason, people will understand what it means to be a free and equal 
citizen of a just liberal democracy. Rawls also highlights the role of formal, civic education for 
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children (Rawls 1993: 199).
　　These suggestions are certainly not objectionable, but they are not enough, in light of 
the level of difficulty that many men and women of faith, for instance, experience in making 
their public and non-public modes of life somehow compatible, in a society that is pluralist in 
a politically liberal way. Rawlsian political liberalism needs to support them more positively 
since Rawls hopes for a situation in which “a reasonable and effective political conception may 
bend comprehensive doctrines toward itself, shaping them if need be from unreasonable to 
reasonable” (Rawls 1993: 246). To interpret this remark in a more individual-centered way, 
individuals who support a reasonable and effective political conception, and that find their 
comprehensive mode of life is not compatible with affirming such conception, may be motivated, 
he hopes, to reconstruct the aspects of their life governed by such doctrine. 
　　It is people’s attraction and attachment to a political conception of justice that may “bend 
comprehensive doctrines” to be compatible with the conception. For example, in the case of 
“justice as fairness” as an example of a political conception of justice, Rawls proposes ideals 
such as free and equal citizenship, political friendship among citizens despite irreconcilable 
differences in their comprehensive lives, and social cooperation for democratic self-governance. 
These ideals are expected to be the source of such attraction and attachment, providing the 
people of a well-ordered society with sufficient reason and motivation to be, and to continue 
to be, willing members of a political society whose basic structure is governed by that 
conception10). These ideals must not only be communicated and learned but also lived, so that 
lived compatibility can be attained between the two modes of an individual’s life. 
　　Individuals need to be provided with ample opportunities not only to learn what it is to be 
a free and equal member of our political society but also to experience this, firsthand, in their 
ordinary lives, and to know what it is like to be and to act as such. Formal civic education would 
be an essential part of any school curriculum; but here, again, ultimate responsibility to provide 
these opportunities falls on citizens themselves. Rawls sees participation in public discussion 
as important in this regard. I agree. Yet, what also seems to be important is the way people 
deal with one another in their everyday life, in the space beyond formal public arenas and 
associations11).
　　This space can serve as an important school for individuals to learn the skills needed to 
be and act as free and equal citizens. There, people can make themselves free from the rules 
and constraints that membership of a particular association more or less entails. This does not 
necessarily mean that they should treat one another with “respect”. Rather, they can learn to 
interact as just plain individuals, disregarding differences in the associational contexts. In this 
way, they can more freely cultivate the basic ability required of them as free and equal citizens 
of a liberal democracy. Through equal and reciprocal treatment, an individual will be more 
ready to understand what it is like to be a free and equal member of his or her society. Citizens 
can also support each other by saying “no” when someone is being treated “undemocratically”. 
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Repeated experiences like these can make one’s self-understanding as a citizen secure, providing 
her with a motivational basis to try to act on her comprehensive life to make and keep it 
compatible with her ability to view herself as a liberal citizen, whenever so expected. If sufficient 
numbers of individuals cooperate to support each other as citizens this way, then society could 
move toward being a society of responsible citizens, which is the prerequisite of reasonable 
pluralism. 
　　Reasonable pluralism, then, is not a static state, but a dynamic process in which individuals, 
in their capacity as citizens, try to reconcile their two life modes, aiming to be part of a liberal 
political society that they wholeheartedly believe is worth their efforts to maintain. In this way, 
they act as the intermediary between the public and the non-public (comprehensive) social 
worlds, maintaining each as appropriately just in its own manner.
5. Conclusion
　　If understood in a more person-centered and dynamic way, the concept of reasonable 
pluralism can be valuable for our liberal living with others, a way of living that is true to its 
aspiration to secure individuals’ comprehensive freedom as much as possible, while nurturing 
and protecting their capacity to be able to act as liberal citizens through mutual cooperation. 
　　This should answer Okin’s concerns to a considerable extent, while avoiding the patronizing 
tone of her (and Rawls’s) argument. She argued for the direct application of political principles 
of justice to the family as a political society’s important task. Her locution and argument tend to 
sound as if she views women, primarily, as individuals to be protected by political society, and 
that it is political society’s responsibility to protect women from any injustice they experience. 
Of course, as Okin argued, there are many ways that political society can and should support 
individuals by making its various institutions consistent with public reason for free and equal 
citizens. But this could inadvertently discourage women from taking initiatives to change their 
social world, effectively leading to their disempowerment. 
　　In contrast, a more individual-centered and dynamic interpretation of reasonable pluralism 
encourages women to act, individually and collectively. A vision of a political society in which 
women are trusted as being able to become responsible citizens should attract wider support 
than one that views women simply as individuals to be protected by their society or by the state. 
If we give individuals a more central role to create and sustain this vision, reasonable pluralism 
could be a valuable concept to overcome the dilemma of liberal inclusion. 
Notes
1) One of the numerous places Rawls makes this clear is the beginning of A Theory of Justice , 
where he states, “[i]f men’s inclination to self-interest makes their vigilance against one another 
necessary, their public sense of justice makes their secure association possible. Among individuals 
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with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic 
friendship…One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental 
charter of a well-ordered human association” (Rawls 1971: 5). 
2) Rawls himself, however, is not clear enough on this point. He often refers to “the fact” of 
reasonable pluralism, but this is misleading. It should be understood, for his theory to be 
consistent, as a part of people’s worldviews in his well-ordered society.
3) It should be noted that Rawls does not regard as “voluntary” any association that is formed 
“voluntarily” from its internal point of view. His standard of voluntariness is whether individuals 
have adopted the form of their associational life under social and political circumstances that we 
as citizens can sincerely regard as just. An association can be voluntary in this sense, while being 
understood, from within, as part of a certain tradition to be followed on a non-voluntary basis, for 
example (Rawls 1999: 162, n.68). Still, the problems mentioned in the text may arise.
4) A similar argument was made by Andrew Smith (Smith 2004). Clare Chambers recently revisited 
Okin and picked up the issue of the family as part of the basic structure (Chambers 2013). Notable 
attempts to defend Rawlsian political liberalism in the present context include works by Sharon 
Lloyd (Lloyd 1994, 1995) and Stephen de Wijze (Wijze 2000). Ruth Abbey provided a useful 
overview of the Okin-Rawls debate (Abbey 2011: 61-82). For summaries of feminist responses to 
Rawls more generally, see those by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2003) and Abbey (Abbey 2013: 
1-23).
5) For example, Corey Brettschneider subscribes to this argument (Brettschneider 2007).
6) Except, perhaps, for unlikely cases in which individuals adopt a citizen’s viewpoint at the start 
of their lives and, only after, live comprehensively within a sphere that a political conception of 
justice delineates.
7) John Tomasi cogently made this point, though, unlike mine, his argument is concerned mainly with 
the viability of diverse cultures, liberal and non-liberal, in a society of political liberalism (Tomasi 
2001).
8) In the first stage, a political conception of justice is constructed by elaborating fundamental ideals 
of liberal political culture (Rawls 1993: 24-5, n.27). Rawls’s “justice as fairness” is one example, 
although he regards it among the most reasonable (Rawls 1993: 167:8). 
9) This term is borrowed from Brettschneider (Brettschneider 2007: 27).
10) Paul Weithman examined this aspect of Rawls’s theory in detail (Weithman 2010: 270-343).  
11) On this point, I drew insights from Nancy Rosenblum. She stressed the importance of “the 
democracy of everyday life”, cultivated in “the interstices of groups and attachments” (Rosenblum, 
1998: 350-9).
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